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ABSTRACT
Creativity is a deeply debated topic, as this concept is
arguably quintessential to our humanity. Across different
epochs, it has been infused with an extensive variety of
meanings relevant to that era. Along these, the evolution
of technology have provided a plurality of novel tools for
creative purposes. Recently, the advent of Artificial In-
telligence (AI), through deep learning approaches, have
seen proficient successes across various applications. The
use of such technologies for creativity appear in a natural
continuity to the artistic trend of this century. However,
the aura of a technological artefact labeled as intelligent
has unleashed passionate and somewhat unhinged debates
on its implication for creative endeavors. In this paper, we
aim to provide a new perspective on the question of cre-
ativity at the era of AI, by blurring the frontier between
social and computational sciences. To do so, we rely on
reflections from social science studies of creativity to view
how current AI would be considered through this lens. As
creativity is a highly context-prone concept, we underline
the limits and deficiencies of current AI, requiring to move
towards artificial creativity. We argue that the objective
of trying to purely mimic human creative traits towards
a self-contained ex-nihilo generative machine would be
highly counterproductive, putting us at risk of not harness-
ing the almost unlimited possibilities offered by the sheer
computational power of artificial agents.
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite its substantial contributions to scientific research,
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has focused on mathematico-
logical approaches, aiming to solve formal problems with
a set of well-defined goals. Evenwith the constant thrilling
leaps in this field, recently crystallized around the field of
deep learning, the current state of our knowledge seems
to remain far from understanding creative endeavors. The
study of this more intricate human behavior proves to be
crucial through two main aspects. On the one hand, it
involves the understanding of creativity, this aspect that
so fundamentally distinguishes human beings from other
branches of the tree of life [49]. On the other hand, its
principal object of study requires to model cognitive phe-
nomena that are central to our social and intellectual evo-
lution [26]. The growing interest for these issues is re-
flected in the widespread research efforts on generative
models for a wide variety of tasks from diverse horizons,
spanning industrial to fundamental sciences [35].
Amidst these questions, music provides an ideal frame-
work for developing our comprehension of creative be-
haviors, as it brings together stimulating theoretical ques-
tions and cognitive processes that are strenuous to model.
Indeed, music operates on unsupervised objectives, hardly
defined through task-oriented goals. Hence, revealing these
musical creative mechanisms can also provide a remark-
able projector on creativity in general, as music is one of
the most highly organized, interactive and complex hu-
man activity, while being an abstract, sensitive and phys-
ical one, profoundly shaping a powerful metaphor of hu-
man creative interactions. From an epistemological per-
spective, approaches in computational creativity can be
broadly divided into two major view. Historically, com-
putational models developed for problem-solving aspects
have been hijacked a posteriori by artists as a form of cre-
ative recycling. However, within the AI revolution, an-
other line of thought seems to have carved its own path,
which we term the mathematical reification of cognitive
hypotheses. Indeed, AI is strewn by mimicry of intelligent
behavior witnessed in biological systems, which appears
foundational to this field. We, as humans, are bound to
address only ideas that our own perception can reach. As
Blake wrote "Man’s desires are limited by his perceptions;
none can desire what he has not perceiv’d" [11]. Hence,
we can only reason on conceptual objects that are acces-
sible to our own thoughts. However, this reification ap-
proach appears inherently limited, as it is stranded by our
current observations and limited cognitive knowledge.
In this paper, we try to stroll down a novel path of
thought, taking a different stance to that of reification,
aiming to scrutinize mathematical aspects of AI through
the sociological aspects of creativity. Hence, we seek to
blur the frontier between social and computational sci-
ences by infusing mathematical properties of AI across a
concomitant review of cognitive and psychological stud-
ies of creativity. This approach can be seen as an intel-
lectual experiment reflecting our current understanding of
creativity in the era of AI. As we try to evaluate the inher-
ent limitations, and what path could be contrived for future
researches in AI, we argue that computers have a propen-
sity to expand our limits, and are complementary to our
own flaws and limits. Hence, an approach purely based on
mimicry of human cognitive behavior would be counter-
productive, putting us at risk of not harnessing the almost
unlimited possibilities offered by the sheer computational
power of machines. Studying these questions could fos-
ter and enrich the relationship between humans and AI
by targeting situations of partnership converging towards
more symbiotic co-creative interactions. Hence, address-
ing these questions could give rise to a novel generic cat-
egory of creatively intelligent systems.
2. EPISTEMOLOGY OF CREATIVITY
The notion of creativity, core to this paper reflection, is
a topic that could hardly be more central and inseparable
from our humanity. In all human crafts, arts and science
alike, progress seems to be rhythmed by the pace of our
capacity to divorce ourselves with the present, to reinvent
and overtake existing thought patterns, and create novel
ones. While appearing so quintessential and fundamen-
tally distinguishing human beings from other branches of
the tree of life, creativity might be the most prominent ex-
ample of a mental phenomenon that is so central to our
own existence, yet we understand so little about it [21].
2.1. Defining creativity
As we aim to reason on conceptual objects, understand-
ing creativity requires first the ability to precisely define
it. However, the concept of creativity appears to be partic-
ularly multi-faceted and complex to define. As is usually
the case with such highly abstract concepts, decades of de-
bates have first focused on carving out its uniqueness by
delineating it from closely-related concepts such as origi-
nality, genius, imagination and talent [49]. In the collec-
tive subconscious, the core aspect of creativity lies in nov-
elty. In that sense, creativity involves moving across our
preconceived knowledge and creating a schism between
the present and the future [16]. Through this first lens,
creativity seems to put a strain on our relationship with
the future, as it introduces uncertainty. Embracing cre-
ativity implies a hazardous leap forward that might upset
the balance of our pattern-seeking habits, as it is impos-
sible to fully understand the consequences of an entirely
novel concept or object [41]. However, we might take
comfort in the fact that this uncertainty is not boundless,
as creativity (and art alike) does not arise from a concep-
tual void [37]. Even though creativity lives in the realms
of the least predictable concepts, it remains first and fore-
most a contextually-embedded phenomenon [38]
Indeed, creativity involves social aspects, as it impli-
cates individuals in a context, working with a set of ex-
isting patterns of meanings and symbols at a given time
in history [28]. The significance and relevance of creative
ideas is not solely observed in their content, but within
the social framework and historical period at which these
ideas are produced. Ideas appear relevant only when a
group of persons articulate their thoughts around the same
set of questions [49], and a critical mass of knowledge de-
velops in one place. Hence, creativity offers variation and
depends equally on the properties of the environment as
on its own quality [17]. Conversely, what was deemed rev-
olutionary and obtained widespread acclaim at one point
will gradually be integrated as an impending norm of the
era, slowly becoming mundane in the society and domain
it operates [18]. An emblematic example in the musical
realm is that of musical synthesizers [46]. When they
appeared, audio synthesizers remained for long confined
to the fringe of contemporary and experimental music,
producing unheard sounds that were too unsettling to be
deemed musical yet. It is only through a gradual evolu-
tion period that these sounds emerged across almost all
musical genres, which now commonly integrate different
levels of audio synthesis. In that sense, creativity is a
transformative process, adapting and integrating elements
to a domain with predefined norms, steadily shifting and
adapting these norms [45].
In summary, although creativity is complex and multi-
faceted, it can be articulated around three major compo-
nents of novelty (creative ideas are innovative), quality
(appeal of the idea) and relevance (the idea is appropri-
ate to the task and era) [33]. Hence, studying creativity
requires to consider a large number of nuances, which are
themselves mostly subjective and renders the analysis of
creativity as a set of empirically testable hypotheses rather
tedious. This might explain why the empirical study of
creativity is only at a very precocious stage.
2.2. Historical aspects
There is a strong historical component to the development
and social perception of creativity, for long stranded be-
tween notions of madness or genius. Different eras and
societies have been more or less conducive to flourish-
ing creativity, with blossoming periods such as Ancient
Greece, Italian Renaissance or French LumiÃl´res. To un-
derstand these disparities, we provide a scarce outline of
the conceptual evolution of creativity along history, based
the excellent work of Runco [49]. For a long time, West-
ern societies only considered creative traits in the artis-
tic domain, with a widespread predilection for the myth
of the "lone genius". Overlaying the strongly theistic vi-
sions of societies at that time, creativity was viewed as
a divine intervention, manifested as an outside "spirit" or
"muse" for which the individual creator was merely a con-
duit [49]. This vision started to shatter, when the scien-
tific era blossomed around the 18th century. This most
influential event in the history of creativity, consecrated
that all people exhibit different levels of talent in the wake
of education, and that the "original genius", which was a
form of rule-defying exception [22], was divorced from
the supernatural. In response to the industrialization of
Europe, Rousseau and the Romanticism movement ex-
pressed a separation between the scientific rationalism and
the need for humans to rely on their natural feelings as a
source of wisdom. This vision created a schism in the so-
cietal vision fracturing the rational scientist with the mis-
understood deviant artist [49]. This might have created
a paradoxical prejudice allowing to denigrate artists and
creativity as being confined to deviant personalities. This
misconception unfortunately somehow survives in the col-
lective unconscious to this day. Although creative persons
and inventors are touted as a driving force to the improve-
ment of society [41], this image of deviance still allows
for the denigration of artists when need be.
2.3. Roles and construction
A major question lies in the role that creativity plays in
a given society, and why creativity might be so impor-
tant. This outlines the perceived impact of creativity, but
also what aspects are valued in creativity. As discussed
by Gardner [27], creativity can be seen as a temporary
misalignment between an idea and the society in which it
develops. Eventually, as some people are willing to take
more risk and embrace new ideas, these gradually inte-
grate the social fabric and ultimately become an accepted
and standardized part of society.
2.3.1. Creativity in society
Moran [41] proposed to study the functional aspects of the
role that creativity could play in society, proposing that it
mostly endorses functions of improvement or expression.
The improvement role is the effect that a creative object
can have on society (as technological artefacts), while the
expression role is focused on the role that creativity exert
on an individual. Although these two roles seem some-
what dichotomous, they are proposed to interact in more
of a complementary than competitive way.
2.3.1.1. Creativity role as improvement
The vision of creativity as improvement is that which
is often glorified by political or industrial leaders, as a
mandatory tool for the advance of society and humanity.
In that sense, society is seen as a system, which is con-
stantly moving upwards to an hypothetical blessed state
(notwithstanding our complete absence of a shred of knowl-
edge to where that might be). Hence, creativity is the tool
that transport society across the borders of the present to-
wards an idealized future, by shifting norms to a higher
position [49]. Whereas practitioners develop norms, cre-
ativity pulls society forward, while inevitably giving way
to standardization [41]. In that view of creativity as an
enhancer of society, its importance is the goal and that it
allows us to progress towards it.
2.3.1.2. Creativity role as expression
The other role of creativity proposed by Moran [41]
is that of expression, which might be interpreted differ-
ently depending on the society in which it unfolds. In
that aspect, creativity can be regarded as a mean of self-
expression and individuality, while the exact nature of this
expression depends on the permissiveness of the surround-
ing society. These forms of creativity in society are less
focused on their results, and rather allow for solipsistic
and individualistic approaches. Hence, creativity as ex-
pression can be seen as a cathartic activity, which might
be less valued by society.
2.3.1.3. Creativity as transformation of expertise
The two roles of creativity in society can interact and
produce, for instance, improvement as a result of self-
expression. In any case, it is important to note that cre-
ativity is before all a transformational activity. There is a
widely agreed-upon consensus that creativity is only per-
mitted through an existing body of knowledge, strongly
influencing the natue and quality of creative outcomes.
As stated previously, the uncertainty of creativity is not
boundless, as nothing arises from a conceptual void. When
Newton stated "If I have seen further it is by standing on
the shoulders of giants.", he recognized that his own dis-
coveries were only made possible by all the knowledge
accumulated by previous researchers before him. Hence,
creativity is the result of community-built expertise, later
transformed in an incremental fashion
2.3.2. Evolution and construction
This transformational view is epitomized in the evolution-
ary theory of creativity, which proposes an interesting par-
allel between genetic evolution and the development of
creative ideas. The original Darwinian model of Simon-
ton [53] aimed to describe more developmental aspect of
the creative process, but it naturally extends to larger (so-
cietal) scales of how creativity developed across time and
how social factors can come into play. Indeed, creative
ideas are built on previous ones in an adaptive and open-
ended manner [26]. This view of creative ideas evolving
over time through culture can be depicted in Darwinian
terms [6], as pertaining to a form of inheritance of ideas,
which are incrementally adapted to the timely constraints
of their social environment as they pass from one person
to the next. This concept is termed as the dual-inheritance
theory [26], which emphasizes the fact that we inherit both
biological but also cultural information. This theory views
culture as discrete elements, which are submitted to an
adaptation process, both composed of random mutations
and a fortuitous process where ideas are selected because
of outside environmental effects [20].
In that sense, we explore an unknown space of ideas
(variation) and choose to pursue some and not others (se-
lection), turning creativity in a variation-selection algo-
rithm informed by expertise [21]. Here, the social con-
text is of prime interest, as creative ideas are observed
equally for their content and within the social framework
within which these are produced. As ideas appear rele-
vant only when a critical mass of knowledge is articulated
around similar thoughts, this further underlines the ubiq-
uitous need for knowledge, which is transformed through
creative processes. However, this thickens the complexity
of clearly separating intelligence and creativity. Indeed,
intelligence can arguably be described as the process of
associating and transforming existing knowledge. Yet, as
social scientists debated for over a century to delineate
these two behaviors, this warrants the existence of a sim-
ilar need for moving our reasoning from artificial intelli-
gence towards artificial creativity.
2.4. Towards the existence of artificial creativity
Being able to truly delineate intelligence and creativity
would mean that they conceptually live as independent or-
thogonal dimensions, which can each be evaluated sepa-
rately from the other. Hence, this poses the question of
the measure and evaluation of creativity as a dimension
dissociated from intelligence.
2.4.1. Evaluating creativity
The question of assessing creativity might be one of the
most controversial and complicated issue of the field. This
approach (called psychometric) is unique as it also radi-
ates and impact all other types of creativity studies [36].
This entails the sensitive question of measurement, which
appears at first to be dauntingly complex in creative fields.
Yet, this field has a very extensive and flourishing research
history [44], entailing the reliability (agreement and con-
sistency), validity (accuracy of the measurements) [36],
and discriminant validity (not being contaminated by cor-
related concepts of intelligence) [57].
Most approaches to evaluating creativity have revolved
around the idea of separating between convergent and di-
vergent thinking processes. The convergent thinking pro-
cess (a term coined by Joy Paul Guilford [31]) corresponds
to the use of knowledge and reasoning to solve a prob-
lem by eliciting a single solution. Hence, this delineates
a corresponding set of questions that have a single cor-
rect answer. Oppositely, the process of divergent thinking
requires a framework where a wide variety of ideas can
be generated in response to a given question or stimulus.
These tests are usually derived from the seminal Torrance
Test of Creative Thinking, which allows for the construc-
tion of associative hierarchies, such as asking to propose
different novel uses of a commonly known object [21].
In the musical realm, another stream of research rely on
improvisation in jazz where a given melody should either
be completed from memory (control) or freely (creative),
while keeping some parameters (length, tempo) fixed [43].
Interestingly, this dichotomywould appear to provide a
clear-cut and simple solution to our previous conundrum.
By crudely exaggerating, we could conclude that intelli-
gence is convergent, while creativity is divergent. How-
ever, it should also be noted that some criticisms exist on
the fact that creative processes also result from convergent
thinking [21], as creative ideas can be the fruit of labori-
ous trial-and-error works. Still, the domain of divergent
thinking seems to remain a privileged ground reserved to
creative behaviors.
2.4.2. AI for creativity in the light of social sciences
Following our previous discussions, it would first seem
that AI approaches are only relevant to convergent think-
ing. Indeed, it is usually secluded to the definition of
problem-solving approaches, where the learning is formal-
ized by having a given single correct solution, which al-
lows to understand and evaluate the quality of the pro-
posed model. However, these limitations are partly by-
passed in the AI domain by using approaches based on
probabilistic formulations [8], where we try to understand
the entire distribution of given types of data, rather than
answering a question (such as classifying objects).
If we take a closer look at the criteria that are used
for divergent thinking tests, these are usually evaluated on
several indicatorsmeasuring the ideational fluency (amount
of answers), originality (unusualness of answers), flexibil-
ity (variance in the concepts elaborated) and elaboration
(precision and details of the answers) [43]. A criticism of
this evaluation method is that fluency can act as a contam-
inating factor in the originality scores, emphasizing the
quantity over quality of ideas [43].
By construction, probabilistic modeling could easily
overpower any human on these tests for fluency and flex-
ibility. Indeed, an approach based on probability distri-
bution estimation can produce an infinite number of solu-
tions and these can be as distant as we want. However,
there is two caveats to this reasoning. First, this implies
that we rely on a random sampling process to draw solu-
tions, which already means that we perform some choice
on the generative process. However, this generation being
an (hypothetically) entirely random decision mechanism,
it can already be seen as a form of human choice on the
creative process. Second, the flexibility aspect is related
to the sampling of a pre-defined distribution, which lim-
its the model to produce examples that remain consistent
with its original observations. Therefore, this greatly lim-
its the output of the model to the set of knowledge that
was selected and provided at the onset.
As discussed earlier, expertise is a fundamental part of
creativity, as it allows to obtain more efficient reasoning,
based on appropriate problem representations, and recall-
ing domain-relevant patterns or invariant characteristics
[36]. Following our ideas from the previous sections, it
also seems that this social context component in the eval-
uation of creativity can be limiting to human creativity.
Oppositely, computational approaches can be freed from
these societal biases, and generate an almost infinite num-
ber of solutions. However, this also introduces a novel
caveat, that AI is trained to optimize a given distribution
of pre-existing knowledge and it cannot evaluate the qual-
ity of its own solution in any other way than the criterion,
which is provided for training it. This lead to a paradox-
ical situation, where there can be a boundless number of
solutions, but in an inherently limited system bound by the
model, knowledge and criterion choice.
All of these observations warrants the question of what
could be the place of AI in the creative process. Hence,
we loop back to our previous question of finding a way to
transition from artificial intelligence to artificial creativity.
Indeed, if we have access to a seemingly infinite genera-
tion machine, but this machine is unable to evaluate its
own correctness, and only produces variations of existing
concepts, what creative use could we make of this system
with peculiar characteristics.
3. ON THE INTRINSIC LIMITS OF AI FOR
SELF-CONTAINED CREATIVITY
We now try to cast a light on the limits of relying on AI to
produce its own self-contained creative behaviors, by dis-
cussing the main body of our argument, through reviewing
all studies surrounding the creative process.
3.1. Studying the creative process
The dominant paradigm to study the creative process scru-
tinizes its structure as a set of stages, defining componen-
tial cognitive processes in a sequential or recursive fash-
ion. The seminal model of Wallas [58] separates the cre-
ative process between the preparation (information gath-
ering), definition (problem finding), incubation (reflecting
on ideas), illumination (appearance of a solution) and ver-
ification (testing the quality of the solution) stages. This
very linear model has since been more widely replaced
with a cyclical one, where stages are performed in various
combinations and are highly influenced by (extrinsic or
intrinsic) motivation [50]. Although it is now recognized
that creativity is dynamic and interactive, looping between
different stages, the original components of Wallas remain
widely used even in modern refinements.
In the view of cognitive theory, any phenomenon can
potentially be recreated if we understand all of its princi-
ples. This should allow to address any complex and ar-
duous problem by splitting it in smaller understandable
phenomena. The underlying hypothesis is that ill-defined
problems can be broken into a set of smaller well-defined
objectives [51]. This cognitive approach, which focuses
on the operators and strategies that come into play in the
creative processes has been a privileged playground for
defining how AI should mimic creative behaviors.
3.2. Mathematical reification of ideas
The abstraction of the creative process has been a core
study for cognitive approaches and one of the most fertile
ground for the mathematical reification of ideas in AI re-
search. In that view, AI should be bound to mimic human
creative endeavors by reproducing the abstraction and tac-
tics that come into play in our brains. In that sense, the
cognitive approaches have been mostly concerned with
fundamental processes that can be translated in compu-
tational terms. This entails the extent to which knowledge
and information are organized and accessed, through dif-
ferent types of memory systems, and the corresponding
processes for retrieval and analysis of various sources of
information. Subsequently, the operations applied to this
knowledge allow to circumscribe the creative process in
a computational sense. Here, we broadly separate these
views between these information and operation aspects,
with some permeability across these categories. We study
the major sub-processes as they have been analyzed in
cognitive studies, while trying to tie links with how this
reflects on corresponding approaches in AI research.
3.2.1. Information
There is a widely agreed consensus that creativity is only
permitted through an existing body of knowledge, which
strongly influences the quality of creative outcomes. This
influence can be analyzed through the ways this knowl-
edge is organized (information structures), retrieved (ac-
cess strategies), analyzed (similarity evaluation) and even-
tually transformed.
3.2.1.1. Organization
When receiving novel knowledge, humans create in-
formation structures and hierarchies allowing to memo-
rize and organize it. At the neural level, it appears that
neighboring neurons encode similar micro-features, and
distance between neurons can be interpreted as a proxy
for their feature similarity [26]. Furthermore, these dis-
tributed representations of micro-features induce a natural
modularity that do not require any proactive mechanism
for high-level organization. As the memory supposedly
work in a content-addressable way, it appears reasonable
that we gradually transitioned from coarse to finer repre-
sentations of memories [26]. Hence, we evolved towards
increasingly complex overlapping distributions, allowing
for more interconnections and recall, leading to relation-
ships drawn frommore integrative internal representation.
These more complex associative hierarchies allow to
handle intricate concepts with a variable organization of
cognitive elements, objects and relationships [32]. The
appearance of these systems is theorized to have produced
emerging complex internal representation of abstract mean-
ings through symbols and their relationships. As proposed
by Deacon [19], we shifted from an iconic representation
(simply storing physical or visual properties) to an index-
ical representation (representing a set of properties) and
finally to a symbolic representation (where the representa-
tion itself bears no similarity to the object it represents).
For Deacon, the birth of symbols allowed us to imagine
the use of objects as elements with correlations separate
from their simple physical properties, enabling more intu-
itive and associative thinking processes. All of these ideas
are crystallized in AI around the representation learning
field [7], where the goal is to understand and learn proper-
ties of a given set of objects in an unsupervised way (only
having access to the objects themselves). This is usually
performed based on some more or less complex forms of
compression in order to produce higher-level and smaller
representation hierarchies.
3.2.1.2. Retrieval
Parallel to the development of these specialized neural
circuits to structure knowledge, our brains also required
to define mechanisms to access and retrieve this informa-
tion. Indeed, when engaging in creative thinking, we need
to rely on different granularities of representation levels,
from very specific to highly abstract. The resulting re-
trieval process obviously depends on the underlying orga-
nization but also the accessibility of different knowledge
items [61]. The internal (physical) constraints of retrieval
can provide either highly similar ideas, or oppositely aim
to process abstract and distant concepts.
An encompassing model for understanding cognitive
information retrieval is the path-of-least-resistance pro-
posed by Ward [59]. This model posits that our predom-
inant retrieval mechanism is to access basic and specific
low-level examples from a given domain as starting points,
while projecting their properties on the novel task at hand.
This suggests that we can use the representativeness of in-
formation items as a retrieval likelihood function. It also
supports the idea that remote associations, less represen-
tative and distant concepts can lead to higher novelty [61].
Supplementary constraints such as latent inhibition allow
us to attend selectively to those information that appear
the most relevant, while screening out irrelevant knowl-
edge. However, it has been shown that the lack of such
inhibitions might provide a greater ideational fluency of
creativity [25]. Indeed, using more distant concepts have
been shown to increase originality, but this may come at
the cost of practicality. This process of contextually se-
lecting some parts in information is also highly reflected
in modern AI through the idea of attention mechanisms
[56]. These approaches compute additional vectors that
allow to contextually mask part of the information at dif-
ferent levels of processing, leading to the nowwell-known
transformers models.
3.2.1.3. Analysis
Our ability for organized information retrieval allows
to perform further analyses of this knowledge. This pro-
cess has been scrutinized through the notion of contextual
focus, where creative inspiration occurs when our atten-
tion is defocused, allowing more associative thoughts and
to activate simultaneously distant representations [40]. This
form of defocused attention would allow to broadcast dif-
fusely to broader region of our memory, allowing to con-
sider a larger variety of elements rather than attentively
select distinct elements as in convergent thinking. This
type of broad activation with looser definition of similarity
and selection could be primordial to associative thinking,
while still being based on probabilistic relationships be-
tween knowledge elements. This posits the existence of a
separation between explicit cognition maps allowing con-
vergent reasoning for problem-specific approaches, while
implicit cognition would allow to reason on distant cre-
ative associations between elements [47]. Interestingly,
these hypotheses contrast with our previous parallel to the
attention mechanisms in AI, pointing out to a potential
paradoxical limit in this reification process.
3.2.1.4. Transformation and meta-representation
Although transforming information could already seem
to belong to the operations category, reorganization and
transformation might already occur on our existing infor-
mation structures. Indeed, as the phenomenon of neural
plasticity is commonly accepted, there is also potentially
some reorganizing mechanisms to allow existing knowl-
edge categories to be formed based on task-specific objec-
tives [61]. This could be facilitated by modules of meta-
representation, serving to represent "concepts over con-
cepts" [54]. This interesting notion would permit to fa-
cilitate high-level reasoning across different domains, es-
pecially in the case of analogies and metaphors. Hence,
this type of second-order system could provide us with
the ability to reflect on our own knowledge representa-
tions and processes [20].
3.2.2. Operations
Cognitive approaches emphasize the concept that individ-
uals generate creative ideas by exploring their knowledge
through different types of operations. Hence, we discuss
in this section the ways in which we explore and develop
relationships between different knowledge items. Several
attempts to produce an encompassing model of such cre-
ative operations have been proposed, such as the propul-
sion model of Sternberg [55]. This model delineates a
classification of creative operations as replication (trans-
forming known ideas), redefinition (seeing known ideas
in a new way), incrementation (extending known ideas),
advance incrementation (similar but going further an ac-
ceptable threshold), reconstruction (reviving a previously
abandoned idea) and reinitiation (starting an idea at a rad-
ically different new point). Although this proposal is in-
teresting, we rather follow here a categorization which is
closer to the technical AI-based views and more prone
to potential reification. Hence, we split different ideas
between the modification (transforming a single item of
knowledge), association (linking several items or ideas),
analogy (existing ideas are transferred to a new domain)
and abstraction (finding a more general concept encom-
passing several existing ideas).
3.2.2.1. Modification
The largemajority of advances in any domain are based
on small incremental changes in various ideas pertaining
to that field. These operations imply to slowly modify
existing ideas to include increasingly complex variations.
This appears logical as creative objects must usually strike
the right balance between familiarity and novelty. This be-
havior can also clearly be seen in the publication patterns
of any scientific field. This operation can also sometimes
be evidenced even within the production of a single object.
For instance, in music, the notion of theme and variations
is highly present, where the same material is exposed and
varied along a given musical piece. With this modifica-
tion operation, it is usually necessary to understand the
existing similarity with the target idea and features inside
the given domain. This would imply a gradual access to
the most readily similar instances given similar features,
leading to a form of exemplar generation [60]. Although
this can be seen in several approaches in AI, the variations
remain in a confined set as delineated by the choice of
the model and dataset, following our previous argument
pointing out to this inherent limitation (Section 2.4.2).
3.2.2.2. Association
The second type of well-studied creative operation is
that of association or combination of existing knowledge
and ideas. The conceptual combination implies to process
complex forms of similarities between apparently hetero-
geneous ideas, in order to generate a novel concept by
merging these elementary ideas. This notion of allowing
two contradictory ideas to be entertained simultaneously,
called Janusian thinking is critical to creative ideation.
Usually, this combination process allows the emergence
of features that are beyond the simple summation of their
components. Hence, combining distant concept and rec-
onciling their discrepancies allows to postulate novel prop-
erties that are absent from the original concepts, which is
core to creativity [61]. Generally, the combination pro-
cess requires to perform integration between ideas that
are not usually grouped into a single coherent concept or
even space, which requires to break traditional thinking
patterns. Regarding AI approaches, this seems extremely
complex, as it transgresses the notion of physical proper-
ties distance, and even requires to go beyond conceptual
distance aspects. To the best of our knowledge, this oper-
ation appears to currently be out-of-reach for AI models.
3.2.2.3. Analogy
Another type of process that has been repeatedly exam-
ined in creativity studies is the concept of analogy, where
existingwell-structured knowledge is projected onto a novel
domain. On a simple basis, analogies can be used to apply
given solutions from a domain to another, or communi-
cating ideas in a more concise way. However, the real
force of analogical reasoning appears when it connects
the source and target domains at very profound levels of
knowledge, rather than merely on their surface [29]. As
an interesting but somewhat looser parallel, this notion is
currently highly studied and successful in the AI field, de-
fined as the task of domain transfer [9]. In this approach,
part of the properties from an object (defined as source
content) are transferred to a given domain (defined as tar-
get style). However, this process mostly aims to transform
some low-level perceptual properties of objects rather than
some profound conceptual aspects.
3.2.2.4. Abstraction
The abstraction category is the most intricate and com-
plex to grasp, as it involves to work at higher-level spaces
of logical reasoning. Here, we link this idea to our inher-
ent predictive system that is thought to be one of the criti-
cal function of the brain [21]. Evidence suggest that there
are general appraisal and reward-based mechanisms in the
brain that would provide incentives for learning. In that
sense, the abstraction operation could allow us to perform
more accurate predictions, by using these past rewards as
global indicators for enhancing our own decision mecha-
nisms. This relates to our previous discussion on the def-
inition and learning of novel representation spaces (Sec-
tion 3.2.1). Indeed, some approaches have tried to per-
form prediction directly in these spaces [42], as a proxy
to reorganizing knowledge. However, these still do not
provide forms of higher abstraction.
3.2.3. Limitations
As we reflect back on our presentation of different aspects
of the creative process, we can see that our understanding
of different stages is limited to that of preparation (seen
as information gathering) and incubation (seen as opera-
tions on this knowledge). Following various components,
there seems to be currently no equivalent to the steps of
problem finding and illumination. However, these steps
are critical to the creative process, and it appears that the
most functional parts of any purely creative behaviors are
still entirely human-based. This would point out to a form
of partiality in artificial creativity, as the major aspects of
its stages still seem to be out of reach.
As we outlined throughout the definition of creativity
(Section 2.1), the appreciation of its characteristics is usu-
ally separated between the three factors of novelty, quality
and social relevance. Hence, we try in the following to de-
lineate the potential limitations of AI for creativity based
on these three major criteria separately.
3.3. Creativity and novelty
The novelty aspect of creativity might be one of the most
prominent in the collective subconscious. However, this
might also be one of the most critical and complicated
point to address in a computational approach. This re-
lates to the way that systems are optimized by learning
on a set of examples [30]. Indeed, training a given model
usually relies on minimizing the expectation of a loss (er-
ror) term. This implies that we are computing a mean er-
ror across a set of known examples. This also means that
the model is incentivized to perform correctly on the most
common elements of knowledge, by trying to fit the prin-
cipal mode of the distribution (where most examples are
concentrated). Conversely, the unusual (outliers) exam-
ples will have the lowest impact on the model training,
and will mostly be ignored to avoid skewing the global
error term. However, as we discussed earlier, creativity
highly relates to dealing with these types of distant exam-
ples. Hence, the major question is to know whether AI
models could truly provoke novelty through some given
operational mechanisms, or if this would be bound to re-
quire a human intervention. Although AI is successful in
the organization and retrieval of knowledge, the combi-
nation of conceptual elements drawn from memory stem
from largely more complex processes.
The psychologist Margaret Boden has given much at-
tention to the relations between creativity and machines
[12]. In this view, the ability to find new, surprising and
socially valuable ideas can occur in three main ways: com-
binatorial (producing novel configurations of familiar ma-
terials), exploratory (discovering new paths in conceptual
spaces) or transformative (when the space itself is dis-
rupted giving way to ideas that were previously incon-
ceivable). Hence, there might be some yet uncovered op-
erations that might favor creativity in AI, by empowering
their decision-making traits. This line of thought is princi-
pally developed in the reinforcement learning approaches,
where agents are defined to explore spaces of possibili-
ties. However, these require the definition of rewards and
success functions that are still complex to define, as they
relate to subtle perceptual and contextual aspects of the
generated objects.
3.4. Evaluating the creative quality
Regarding the evaluation of the creative quality, there ap-
pears to be a strong duality in this question. On one hand,
learning approaches are trained by minimizing a criterion,
which should serve as a proxy for quality. However, this
loss usually pertains to some structural aspects of the gen-
erated data, rather to more abstract aspects of its content.
Hence, AI models are still unable to determine the real
creative value of what they produce. To allow this com-
plexity of understanding, we need to be able to evaluate
both the creative product, but also the process itself.
Hence, one of the major flaws of AI applied to creativ-
ity appears to lie within its inability to judge the creative
structures that emerge from exploratory processes. In a
more global sense, this amounts to say that AI approaches
bear no artistic intent. Although this appears to be a pretty
straightforward observation, this can be traced back to the
question of measurement. Indeed, in order to provide a
solution to this issue, we would need not only a computa-
tional definition of creative ideas, but most importantly a
criterion of evaluation on what are low-probability events
that still appear relevant. This question of relevance re-
lates strongly on the notion that creativity can only be
evaluated within a given societal context.
3.5. The notion of context
As we emphasized in previous discussions, creativity is
highly contextual and deeply related to cultural aspects.
One of the most notable differences in the conception of
creativity can be found in the separation between West-
ern societies seeing creativity as a godly intervention con-
veyed through an outside spirit, and Eastern societies that
historically considered creation as a discovery or mimicry
of something already pre-existing in the universe. This
discrepancy in the evaluation of creativity can also be seen
in what different cultures revere as a form of artistic ex-
pression. For instance, Japanese civilization highly values
the works of calligraphers, sword makers and ceramicists
as art [52], which is less prominent in Western societies.
This influence of culture on our daily life is so pervasive
and deeply intertwined with our reasoning that we are not
even able to measure the true impact it may have. An
emblematic example can be experienced in the excellent
book Flatland by Edwin Abbott Abbott, showing that a
person living in a two-dimensional world will most prob-
ably never be able to reason about cubes.
Throughout these aspects, cultures are inherently linked
to languages, as they represent both the way we commu-
nicate, but also the way we think about concepts. Hence,
individuals with diverse backgrounds process information
differently, and have vast varieties in conceptual function-
ing [61]. These differences in language can be generalized
to their largest separation between taxonomic or thematic
ways of conceptualizing ideas [39]. The taxonomic func-
tions of languages is highly dominant in Western cultures,
where the objects and reasoning are "decontextualized".
Hence, the relationships between objects are less impor-
tant than the category to which the object belongs to. Con-
versely, the thematic language constructions which define
Eastern languages put a larger emphasis on the context
and logical or causal relationships between objects, rather
than the individual object taken in isolation. Interestingly,
this is also highly reminiscent and symmetrical to the the-
ological ramifications between Western and Eastern con-
structs, which seem largely impacted by our logos.
Hence, it might appear that the evaluation and novelty
of creativity remain entangled contextual-prone questions.
In order to provide an alternate path to the use of AI in cre-
ativity, this requires to redefine the relationships between
human and machine in creative endeavors.
4. REDEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP WITH AI
THROUGH CO-CREATIVITY
As we have seen across the previous sections, there are
currently still some profound limitations to attain a true
form of artificial creativity. Indeed, current systems do not
show any substantial musical creativity, lacking machine
musicianship (the capacity to processmusic at a structural,
symbolic level, a term coined by Robert Rowe [48]), high-
level interaction strategies or generative autonomy. How-
ever, there still exists interesting avenues to truly harness
the peculiarities of AI models in creativity.
4.1. Different views of AI in creativity
One crucial distinction needs to be made in the use of
AI for creativity depending on the role and place that it
is granted in the creative process. On the one hand, a
whole body of research appears to be devoted to use AI
as self-sufficient generators, which seek to generate entire
pieces of art. The system receives little input from the
user, which now acts as a passive admirer of the creation.
On the other hand, AI systems can be seen as creation
tools, which allows to enhance our own creativity. In that
regard, despite its higher complexity and intellectual ram-
ifications, AI simply holds a position akin to that of an
evolved brush to a painter. This second view provides en-
hanced and facilitated ways to explore information spaces,
but remain entirely subservient to our own creativity.
As we discussed earlier, when using AI in generative
processes, we still need to have a precise and well-defined
problem, along with a set of representative data. Hence,
this already highly constrains the potential behavior of the
algorithm, as we delineate the world of possibilities that
are attainable and explored by the model. Furthermore,
we also implicitly limit the capacity of the models to eval-
uate their own realization, as we define a certain train-
ing criterion and loss function, which acts as a learning
signal. However, this will also constrain the view of the
model to a single facet of the produced artefact. All of
these observations relates to the question of creativity as
a problem-finding rather than problem-solving activity. It
is sometimes more crucial to find an interesting question
rather to find solutions to existing ones.
Current models of computational creativity focus on
the ability to generate novel content. However, as dis-
cussed previously, the highly context-prone aspects of cre-
ativity seem to confine this singularity-seeking approach
to a pointless endeavor. Oppositely, it should be recog-
nized that creativity traits should be shared between hu-
man and machines. Indeed, most works do not consider
the rich interplay and collaborations that emerge in the in-
teraction and control of creative approaches themselves.
Indeed, most models are proposal generators, where we
can pick from a list of ideas. Instead, we should aim to
establish co-creativity partnerships focusing on the inter-
actions dynamics, by evaluating a variety of collaboration
strategies. To do so, the first step is to define the problem
space itself, which can already be a daunting task.
4.2. AI as a creativity-enhancing tool
Whatever type of AI we might define, it still requires some
form of human supervision. First, relying on AI as a
creativity-enhancing tool requires to augment computa-
tional creativitymodels with artificial perception, by learn-
ing representation spaces for on-line music structure dis-
covery and generative decisions based on cognitive dy-
namics by infusing social sciences in computing models.
Drawing an analogy to the previous section, first finding
disentangled representation spaces of information is a de-
cisive and primordial aspect to any creative process.
This process of unsupervised learning is still poorly un-
derstood, even though it is one of the key towards new
generations of learning algorithms. These questions are
crystallized around the field of disentangled representa-
tion learning. The idea of representation learning is to
find compressed spaces (termed latent spaces) of infor-
mation with a logical organization, while the disentangle-
ment seeks to have the dimensions of these spaces to rep-
resent each factor of variation in the data separately. This
question is usually approached through the use of Varia-
tional Auto-Encoders (VAEs) [34]. Although the use of
VAEs for audio applications has only been scarcely inves-
tigated, we recently proposed a perceptually-regularized
VAE [23] that learns a space of audio signals aligned with
perceptual ratings via a regularization loss. The resulting
space exhibits an organization that is well aligned with
perception. Hence, this model appears as a valid candi-
date to learn an organized audio space. Following this
research, we performed several follow-up studies to as-
sess different generative aspects of these models, such as
addingmusical conditioning [10], introducing othermodal-
ities of knowledge [15] or providing a continuous drum
sounds synthesizer [1]. These types of spaces can pro-
vide an invaluable step in the organization of information
for the creative process, and can already serve as a gen-
erative tool to quickly explore high-level properties. An
exciting direction of research would be to model more ac-
curately the geometric and topological features of these
latent spaces across different learning settings. This ap-
proach could provide insight on the learning process and
new mechanisms to perform unsupervised learning.
These recent researches on information organization
link to our question of expanding the human knowledge.
Indeed, the strength of AI lies in its ability to understand
multivariate and highly non-linear interactions in spaces
with large number of dimensions. Hence, this aspect of
knowledge structuring can enhance our own power over
information structures. As a clear pragmatic example of
this idea, we recently introduced a radically novel formu-
lation of audio synthesizer control [24]. We formalized
this as the general question of finding an invertible map-
ping between organized latent spaces, linking the audio
space of a synthesizer’s capabilities to the space of its pa-
rameters. This model allows to address extremely com-
plex tasks such as parameter inference (finding the pa-
rameters of a synthesizer that reproduces any audio file),
macro-control learning (disentangling and simplifying its
complex controls), and audio-based preset exploration (nav-
igating sets of examples in a perceptually-relevant and
intuitive manner) within a single model. This particu-
lar instance shows that AI can be used as a mean to ef-
ficiently re-organize intricate knowledge, even though it
is already accessible in a more entangled and harder-to-
harness sense. Hence, AI can be an extremely power-
ful creativity facilitator in its ability to organize complex
knowledge in a simplified way.
In order to decisively move towards artificial creativ-
ity, we critically need AI models that are able to listen and
apprehend the musical structure correctly. These higher-
level cognitive phenomena involve long-term memoriza-
tion and structure discovery, usually performed on multi-
ple time scales. In this direction, we worked on different
aspects allowing to perform online semantic information
extraction [13] and multi-scale musical structure predic-
tion [14]. However, this also warrants the need to perform
a machine evaluation of human creative behaviors in or-
der to understand and match the complexity dynamics of
musical interaction. This would allow artificial entities to
infer new modes of a distribution in a self-supervised way
as a proxy for creativity. In that sense, an interdisciplinary
approach is mandatory, where social science and anthro-
pological studies need to collide with machine capacities
and algorithmic approaches.
4.3. Towards models of co-creativity
Overall, it seems that the limits of human creativity are
reciprocally limiting to AI, as we are bound to define pro-
cesses that only mimic our own preconceptions of cre-
ativity. Furthermore, there is a limit in the quest of self-
contained generative AI, as we require these approaches
to generate novel content, but yet strongly conform to the
existing norms of that domain. A solution to this conun-
drumwarrants the need to profoundly redefine the creative
relationship that may exist between human and machines.
Indeed, instead of focusing on the either very subservient
view of AI as proposal tools, or oppositely seeing it as a
self-contained generator, we should acknowledge that the
true power to be harnessed comes from the partnership
between two separate systems (human or machine) with
each its specific characteristics. This idea of co-creativity
emphasizes the fact that creativity is an emerging phe-
nomenon resulting from complex interactions and feed-
backs between actors involved in a creative process. This
allows to regard not only the production of each (human
or artificial) part in isolation, but rather focus on the inter-
action that emerges between different components.
Recently at the IRCAM STMS lab, Assayag [2] has
thoroughly investigated artificial creativity issues involved
in musician-machine interaction, especially in the case of
co-improvisation where agents of different nature (artifi-
cial or human) perform together in highly unpredictable
live settings [5]. Assayag proposed the concept of hu-
man machine co-creativity in music [3], in order to over-
come the aporia inherent to the essentialization of ma-
chines when we try to assign them anthropocentric fea-
tures such as creativity or intelligence, focusing then more
on the relations than on the intrinsic qualities of agents.
Co-creativity in that respect addresses emergent distributed
behaviors inherent to complex cross-learning feed-backs
between agents, and suggests reinforcement mechanisms
pertaining to co-action. This shift in objective allows us
to question different ways to build the best possible tech-
nical tools that could foster and enhance co-creative in-
teractions. According to Assayag [4], co-creativity can
only appear when two features linked to emergence and
non-linear dynamics are identified: (1) emergence of co-
hesive behaviors that are not reducible to, nor explainable
by the mere individual processes of agents; (2) appari-
tion of non-linear regimes of structure formation, lead-
ing to rich co-evolution of creative forms. The under-
lying assumption is that such surging phenomena result
from cross-learning processes between agents involving
complex feed-backs loops and reinforcement. As a ma-
jor consequence, the states and behavior of participating
agents are in return modified continuously, making them
evolve in terms of knowledge and skills. These ideas in-
volve intriguing prospect of modeling the dynamics of
different actors that cooperate to perform complex adap-
tation. This requires anticipatory systems of interaction,
with real-time adaptation that could account for the col-
lective dynamics in creativity.
4.4. Through the doors of perception
As we discussed earlier, AI is inherently limited to opti-
mize a mean accuracy on a given set of data, leading to
the perilous situation of being an infinite norm-generating
machine, which would be detrimental to creativity. This
underlines the risk of overusing AI models towards the
dangerous path of standardisation. While we will not dwell
into the questions of economic gain that could be inter-
twined with this prospect, we still underline the dangers
of indulging in these goals. The current supremacy of
having highly conform thoughts and products, even in the
artistic domain, can only lead to a dampening of creative
endeavors. As an unconventional analogy from biology,
this would resemble a form of genetic drift in creativity
which should be avoided at all costs. This phenomenon
is caused by continuously selecting a given subset of indi-
viduals, which causes the reduction of genetic variance
and an overall impoverishment of the available genetic
material. To transpose this in optimization terms, we would
constrain ourselves to converge and remain stuck in a local
minimum, by removing large parts of our search space.
Although these thoughts might appear as a bleak obser-
vation on the use of AI for creativity, there are glimmers of
hope hiding underneath. The advent of computational ap-
proaches have propelled creative endeavors into horizons
that could never have been reached before, and this path
seems far from being exhausted. These exciting avenues
come from the fact that AI models and human behaviors
can compensate for their respective limitations. In that
sense, AI can easily process complex and multivariate in-
formation without any prior bias. Hence, it can allow us
to deal with objects and concepts that would easily exceed
our perception potential. This also question the episte-
mological reasoning of our quest to perform biologically-
inspired mimicry, when we could harness the power of a
truly novel and somewhat boundless generation tool.
5. CONCLUSION
Across this prospective paper, we tried to review the field
of creativity studies from a social and cognitive standpoint
and tie parallel links to the current development of AI
models. Doing so, we aimed to provide a novel look at
creativity in the era of artificial intelligence. After under-
lining the major limitations of current models from the
lens of cognitive studies, we discussed how the highly
contextual aspects of creativity and the question of qual-
ity measurements prove to be crippling to the singularity-
seeking approach. Hence, blindly following the aspiration
of self-contained generative machines, based on purely
mimicking human creative traits appear as a somewhat
pointless endeavor. Instead, we discussed the possibility
of redefining the relationships between human and ma-
chines through co-creativity approaches. This allows to
scrutinize and empower the link between both agents in
the creative process, rather than the agents taken in isola-
tion, as a main object of study.
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